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Lurking behind the familiar ACC principle of "community responsibility" are some core questions 
about what it means to be a community, and how responsibility is to be assigned. The original ACC 
blueprint took a distinctive approach to both terms – which was diluted in the process of 
implementation and further weakened in successive legislative amendments. And yet, mysteriously, 
over five decades, the language of "community responsibility" has remained at the centre of ACC 
policy discourse. Reflecting on ethical presumptions can clarify these evolving meanings, reframing 
key questions for future ACC debates.   
I BACKGROUND   
The toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents of social progress, and the statistically 
inevitable victims are entitled to receive a co-ordinated response from the nation as a whole.1 
Nearly a half-century ago, a Royal Commission Report prepared the way for New Zealand's 
innovative Accident Compensation legislation (ACC). In that Report, a clever Judge made the case 
for fundamentally transforming a major field of private law, removing personal injury torts from the 
judicial process and replacing them with an alternative administrative scheme. Sir Owen 
Woodhouse concluded that the common law tort action for personal injury failed to meet the needs 
of a changing New Zealand society. His argument went beyond conflicts and anomalies within the 
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formal law, borrowing normative criteria from the larger domain of social welfare: "the whole field 
of inquiry opened up before this Commission is a social rather than a legal question".2 Under these 
circumstances personal injury tort law was beyond reform; it could be put to rest as soon as 
Parliament would enact a more adequate substitute. 
New Zealand was the only country to move all the way through this transformation, although 
similar reforms were actively debated in other common law jurisdictions during the 1960s and 
1970s – in North America, the United Kingdom and Australia (this last project guided by Sir Owen 
himself). The expanding critique of tort law, using extrinsic criteria of social welfare and social 
policy, originated with American legal commentators in the 1920s, prefigured by the 1880s musings 
of scholar/judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.3 Simultaneous with Woodhouse, some academic 
experts (including New Zealander Donald Harris and Canadian Terence Ison)4 were busy pounding 
stronger nails into the tort law coffin. To this day, the Woodhouse Report remains unsurpassed in its 
articulate affirmative vision: a concrete replacement scheme based on a short list of interlocking 
principles. 
A Introducing Community Responsibility 
Woodhouse called his leading principle "community responsibility". It was an ambitious stroke: 
at once a criterion for assessing the failures of traditional tort law, and a blueprint for constructing 
an alternative legal-political injury scheme:5 
People have begun to recognise that the accidents regularly befalling numbers of their fellow citizens are 
due not so much to human error as to the complicated and uneasy environment which everybody 
tolerates for its apparent advantages. The risks are the risks of social progress, and if there are instinctive 
feelings at work today in this general area they are not concerned with the greater or lesser faults of 
individuals, but with the wider responsibility of the whole community. 
From this bedrock notion Woodhouse derived several corollaries: the centrality of injury 
prevention and rehabilitation (missing from existing tort law), the need to compensate all losses 
(missing from current social welfare practices), procedural fairness and cost-efficiency. Over the 
past four decades, much has been written about New Zealand ACC and its troubled implementation, 
both legislative and bureaucratic. ACC moves up and down the political agenda every 10 years or 
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so, driven by ideological trends and practical performance issues. Remarkably, the community 
responsibility phrase itself has escaped the brunt of ACC controversies. With only minor exceptions, 
community responsibility is faithfully retained and respectfully incanted by friend and foe alike, 
arguing opposite sides of reform proposals. Today community responsibility survives as a largely 
hollow phrase, allowing defenders and critics to remain rhetorically connected to ACC ideals that 
have long-since grown opaque. This ritual embrace of community responsibility has had the effect 
of masking Woodhouse's bold ethical challenge. Starting with the initial implementation of ACC in 
the 1970s, the reforms of each decade have diluted and adapted that ethical framework to suit a wide 
variety of purposes – reflecting tacit changes, over these decades, in the common understanding of 
"community" and "responsibility". 
Exploring the ethical dimensions of ACC means untangling our jumbled present. In part it 
means going back in time to assess how Woodhouse himself used this evocative term. But more 
important are the persistent puzzles and paradoxes surrounding the central terms "community" and 
"responsibility". The enigma of community responsibility comes from a dynamic tension in 
operational meanings, hidden beneath the surface of these two broad abstractions. Moving beyond 
historical and conceptual analysis, one reaches urgent questions about future generations in New 
Zealand: what will it mean to be a "community", and how will the main lines of responsibility be 
drawn? Revisiting these ethical dimensions of ACC contrasts with the current "muddling through" 
pattern of ACC debates, pointing toward radical new directions.  
This article reflects on ethics, but the approach is not purely philosophical. Over its long career, 
the dominant forces guiding ACC have not been ethical discourses, but rather changes in everyday 
social structures, economic relations and political engagement. Ethical assumptions enter this 
discussion indirectly, emanating from popular notions about how current society really works. 
Perhaps the most striking trend, since the time in which Woodhouse wrote, has been to translate 
social welfare into broadly economic terms: to understand social action as principally a matter of 
self-interested calculation and exchange. This unmistakable twist in the meaning of society and 
"community" is equally the result of waning confidence in traditional political institutions to 
manage any rival measure of social welfare. Values have thus played a constant role in the half-
century of ACC debates, even if the source of norms remains something of an enigma. In his day, 
Woodhouse steered the personal injury debate out of the legal realm and into the "social" realm. But 
just what kind of society did he imagine, and how was it connected to his key ethical principle of 
community responsibility?  
B Understanding Community Responsibility 
Woodhouse started from the broad surmise that social relations had changed substantially in 
New Zealand in the decades following World War Two. It was a time of growing national 
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prosperity, integration of productive forces, advancing technology – and an increase in the scope 
and scale of uncompensated personal injuries:6  
COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY 
This first principle is fundamental. It rests on a double argument. Just as a modern society benefits from 
the productive work of its citizens, so should society accept responsibility for those willing to work but 
prevented from doing so by physical incapacity. And, since we all persist in following community 
activities, which year by year exact a predictable and inevitable price in bodily injury, so should we all 
share in sustaining those who become the random but statistically necessary victims. The inherent cost 
of these community purposes should be borne on a basis of equity by the community. 
The change in social relations came down to an increase in complexity. Patterns of risk were no 
longer just interpersonal and linear. The aggregate increase in social prosperity carried with it the 
"statistically necessary" and "inevitable" consequence of serious injury for a small and random 
group of victims. Another aspect of complexity was the sequence of knock-on effects from personal 
injury, with consequent losses to family members, workplaces, and extended communities of 
interest:7 
Community Responsibility: If the well-being of the work force is neglected, the economy must suffer 
injury. For this reason the nation has not merely a clear duty but also a vested interest in urging forward 
the physical and economic rehabilitation of every adult citizen whose activities bear upon the general 
welfare. This is the plain answer to any who might query the responsibility of the community in the 
matter. Of course, the injured worker himself has a moral claim, and further a more material claim based 
upon his earlier contribution, or his readiness to contribute to the national product. But the whole 
community has a very real stake in the matter. 
Analytically, the causes of injuries were multiple, interactive and cumulative – not just in the 
workplace and on the highway, but across the many complex roles people play in all facets of their 
lives. Overall the causes are complex, operating on several levels; and so are the consequences, 
where an unexpected event, though entirely a part of modern living – like the rare side-effect from 
standard medications – may have a catastrophic impact on the victim and her entire family. 
Traditional common law had lost any claim to keep up with these developments, harking back to an 
era where causal patterns were transparent and linear, where relevant harms were foreseeable, and 
where actual losses could be readily contained and compensated. From this set of premises, 
Woodhouse found broad new responsibilities for the "community" where such dynamics were 
deeply embedded. 
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C Ignoring Community Responsibility 
The most intriguing mystery surrounding community responsibility is how such a distinctive 
principle has managed to exert so little influence during some four decades of ACC policy debates. 
To be sure, Woodhouse did his original job supremely well: his community responsibility principle 
cast fatal doubt on current tort law, and it was powerful enough to reassure stragglers that realistic 
alternatives could be found. But it had to be toned down in the protracted course of implementing 
ACC legislation, and with each decade its influence seemed to weaken. Admittedly, the tort law of 
the 1960s may have been an easy target, riddled with inconsistencies and anomalies, almost begging 
for some plausible substitute. But even this does not explain the readiness of policy makers to dilute 
the original components of community responsibility. Woodhouse had defined community 
responsibility within a distinctive model of social interaction, yielding a challenging set of ethical 
corollaries. By the early 1970s, this kind of social model was gaining acceptance in other fields of 
public life, notably in environmental policy and public health practice. But it was never embraced in 
the arena that received the Woodhouse Report – not by most lawyers or lawmakers, nor by social 
analysts concerned with injuries and compensation. In these fields, different social models began 
taking root in the 1960s, heavily influenced by formal styles of economic reasoning. These models 
brought their own compelling gloss to the notions of "community" and "responsibility", with quite 
different ethical implications. 
In other countries, these same confounding currents slowed similar critiques of personal injury 
tort law, leaving New Zealand as the lone abolitionist jurisdiction in the common law world. 
Opposition took many forms, including resistance by those with vested interests in the old 
procedures (personal injury lawyers, but also certain plaintiff groups that had managed to game the 
system successfully). There was even a revanchist movement to rebuild traditional tort law on 
cramped moral principles that excluded social welfare calculations, borrowing selectively from the 
philosophies of Kant and Aristotle.8 But the most important challenge came from erstwhile partisans 
for law reform, who adopted a new economic idiom for engaging with social welfare. In academic 
circles this trend became known as "Law and Economics", which largely supported the deregulatory 
turn in public policy unfolding globally during the 1970s. All these changes were still inchoate at 
the time Woodhouse first wrote. But they were rapidly coalescing in the run-up to the first ACC 
legislation in 1972–1974. In such a fluid environment, even a principle as sharply defined as 
community responsibility could lose its edge. 
II ANALOGUES OF COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY 
Woodhouse was not simply a lone voice. Although he worked independently, he articulated 
social/ethical principles that also resonated within the emerging environmental movement. What 
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Woodhouse saw as social interdependence was similar to notions of ecological interdependence, 
popularised in the 1960s by Rachel Carson, with antecedents in Aldo Leopold and Amos Hawley.9 
The enigma surrounding community responsibility may be clarified somewhat by comparison with 
the development of environmental policies, both in New Zealand and globally. The moral urgency 
of environmental protection comes from the same matrix of causal complexity: in both areas there 
are unintended consequences built into the normal activities of an advanced industrial society.  
Harms to the ecosystem are difficult to predict, and they resist simple identification with discrete 
causes, but they are statistically inevitable and randomly allocated. In recent years, these same 
characteristics belong to the quintessential environmental policy challenge of climate change. There 
is also a striking economic similarity, in that both fields call for an accounting of real costs that fall 
outside the operation of existing markets. Sometimes called "external" costs, and also "social costs", 
it is the ethical task of public policy to see that these unpaid costs are remedied in some fashion. 
Their effects can sometimes be mitigated after the fact, but the larger policy goal is to prevent or 
reduce such unpaid costs occurring in the future.   
A Unpaid Social Costs 
One of the early environmental economists formulated these ethical implications in terms that 
anticipated the future Woodhouse principle. Writing in the 1950s, the German-American economist 
K William Kapp drew attention to social costs generated by the post-World War Two industrial 
economy, including pollution, personal injury, disease patterns and other unintended consequences, 
none of which were bargained for. He thus described:10  
… an economy of unpaid costs, "unpaid" in so far as a substantial proportion of the actual costs of 
production remain unaccounted for in entrepreneurial outlays; instead they are shifted to, and ultimately 
borne by, third persons or by the community as a whole. 
… 
The increasing use of the terms "environment" and "ecology" in recent discussions of social costs is to 
be welcomed, provided these terms are interpreted in a sense sufficiently broad to include not only the 
impairment of the physical environment but the impairment … of all external conditions and influences 
affecting the life and development of human beings, human behavior, and hence society. 
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Kapp describes an interactive economy as generating unpaid social costs, imposing 
uncompensated burdens on specific people, which ultimately fall on "the community as a whole". 
From here it is a very short step to Woodhouse's community responsibility principle:11 
Just as a modern society benefits from the productive work of its citizens, so should society accept 
responsibility for those willing to work but prevented from doing so by physical incapacity. And, since 
we all persist in following community activities, which year by year exact a predictable and inevitable 
price in bodily injury, so should we all share in sustaining those who become the random but statistically 
necessary victims. The inherent cost of these community purposes should be borne on a basis of equity 
by the community. 
B Links to Public Health 
Another contemporary echo of Woodhouse's community responsibility principle can be found in 
the field of public health, which developed new research tools for analysing social complexity, 
leading to the discovery of hidden social costs.12 Within New Zealand, public health researchers 
sought to document Woodhouse's claim that the nation as a whole faced a substantial toll of 
uncompensated personal injuries. By 2003 researchers assigned an actual dollar figure to this toll: 
somewhere around NZD 6–7 billion per year.13 These are real losses, accruing annually, with the 
burdens falling on individual victims, their families and onwards through social channels of 
interdependence. As Woodhouse argued, such a burden far exceeds the goals and capacities of the 
common law: this was clearly a social problem, not a legal problem. 
Around the world, in recent decades, public health has applied its powerful research methods to 
elaborate the social interdependence model used by Woodhouse. Public health has more 
sophisticated tools than either law or economics for navigating these complexities. It deals routinely 
with interactive causes, multiple agents and dynamic environments, all of which presented 
insuperable challenges for the old common law doctrines of liability. Within this complex 
environment public health confirms many of the harms Kapp identified as "unpaid social costs", 
dealing with real physical events themselves, and not just the internalised market transactions 
studied by mainstream economics. And like Woodhouse, public health sees the leading policy goal 
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as preventing future harms (primary prevention), followed by mitigation of past harms through 
rehabilitation and, lastly, compensation. 
ACC implementation has largely ignored the expansive public health implications of community 
responsibility by remaining heavily focused on the statutory compensation function.14 To be sure, 
rehabilitation services are included in entitlements as an appropriate medical response to personal 
injury. Controversies often arise over the administration of these benefits, including the complaint 
that the Accident Compensation Corporation (Corporation) uses rehabilitative services in a budget-
saving way; as a blunt instrument for ending compensation for those claiming long-term incapacity. 
There are also periodic news exposés about rehabilitative therapists who have allegedly defrauded 
the system. Overall, ACC policy debates tend to address rehabilitation in strict relation to 
controlling operating budgets. 
At an exceptional moment in 2003, public health perspectives stood behind the creation of a 
New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS). This initiative came through ministry planners, 
rather than from legislation.15 NZIPS was a rare instance where ACC practices expanded to meet 
challenges contained in the original community responsibility principle. Community responsibility 
assigns responsibility to New Zealand society as a whole to invest in prevention, even more than 
compensation, to reduce the toll of personal injury. In practice, the impact of NZIPS proved to be 
minimal, and it was disestablished in 2013. Despite some highly professional planning, the strategy 
was economically driven in a narrow sense, focusing on preventing types of injuries that place large 
financial burdens on the Corporation budget – important but discrete problems like back injuries, 
serious rugby injuries and accidental drownings. By contrast, from the ethical perspective of 
community responsibility, the relevant cost consideration is not to reduce the Corporation's 
operating budget, but rather to reduce the much larger social toll of personal injury, advancing 
unchecked into the future. This toll represents real costs – they are Kapp's unpaid social costs, which 
are left as real burdens for the statistically inevitable victims and their families. 
III THE MYSTERIOUS DECLINE OF COMMUNITY 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Despite this rich background, the mystery surrounding the eclipse of community responsibility 
still remains unsolved. Back in 1967 Woodhouse articulated community responsibility forcefully, 
laying out all the implications: describing a new institutional structure for addressing the 
burdensome toll of personal injury. It was not just a rejection of the common law system. Instead 
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prevention: William V Vosburgh "Primary Prevention, Priorities, and Implementation: The Case of the New 
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Compensation Corporation "New Zealand Injury Prevention Strategy (NZIPS)" (9 April 2014) 
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Woodhouse laid out an alternative framework, an amalgam of social modelling and ethical 
reasoning, as a powerful measure of how and why the tort system was failing New Zealand society.  
His approach was similar to frameworks that would soon emerge for environmental policy in many 
countries around the world. Moreover, it anticipated the powerful research apparatus of public 
health, with links also to what an earlier generation of economists referred to as "unpaid social 
costs". Why then has this distinctive principle been effectively muted across five decades of ACC 
policy debates? 
A Economic Issues 
The most accessible answer to this mystery is that the programme laid out by Woodhouse would 
be too costly. Perhaps it should be done, under ideal conditions, but there is not enough money in 
the pipeline. This explanation can find immediate support in the New Zealand policy dialogue, even 
though it meant ignoring the core ethical challenge framed by community responsibility. The whole 
point of community responsibility is that the costs of personal injury have already been paid – 
falling on victims and spreading throughout their networks. Although these costs do not appear, as 
such, on any corporate or government balance sheet, they are nonetheless real. The community's 
responsibility is to redress a skewed distribution of social costs, already incurred, whose very 
randomness augments the burden shared by everyone. Seen as a community of risk sharing, New 
Zealand could not continue absorbing the toll of injury costs. In responding, the community as a 
whole must provide funding for remedial programmes. From one economic standpoint, programme 
costs would more than pay for themselves if they are understood to reduce social costs. But making 
this leap would become the decisive political barrier for the emergence of Woodhouse's community. 
As we shall explore in a moment, Woodhouse had already anticipated policy objections based on 
programme costs. His strategy prevailed in the fact that ACC was ultimately adopted, but the 
demurral on programme costs was never silenced. 
B Academic Turn to Welfare Economics 
In another historical coincidence, these affordability debates found a broader base of support in 
the arcane academic field of Law and Economics. Ideas from this movement showed up in New 
Zealand as early as the 1969 White Paper, which offered the first blueprint for legislative 
implementation of the Royal Commission Report. It was in this White Paper and surrounding 
deliberations that proponents of the ACC scheme began to soften the hard edges of community 
responsibility, importing concepts of market efficiency that would obscure Woodhouse's focus on 
social costs.16 During the 1960s, an American legal expert on torts was reshaping the ethics of tort 
reform by importing the dryer norms of welfare economics. According to Professor (now Judge) 
Guido Calabresi, the proper goal for public policy was neither to compensate injured people nor to 
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reduce future accidents, as such. Rather the goal – to put it precisely – was to limit the scale of 
future accident prevention in accordance with a calculus of economic efficiency.17 From an ethical 
point of view, there was no other policy standard worth considering. In short, preventing future 
accidents must not be pursued without limit; it may be cheaper to society as a whole (and thus 
better) to allow some accidents to happen. (Needless to say, the balance sheets entering into this 
efficiency calculation still exclude the unpaid costs studied by Kapp.) While this may seem like a 
complicated balancing act, proponents seemed to relish the intellectual challenge – all of it 
unfolding at the level of axioms and hypothetical models. As it trickled down to ordinary policy 
debates in New Zealand and elsewhere, the message was much simpler: "everything in moderation; 
don't overspend". 
When it comes to compensating people already injured, Calabresi agreed that the tort system 
itself was poorly designed for this purpose, conceding much of what Woodhouse and others had 
painstakingly shown.18 But in reforming that system, Calabresi's chilling advice was to limit 
compensation to precisely those cases where payments would promote efficient levels of future 
accident prevention. One need not be distracted by the personal needs or deserts of the injured 
victim. Calabresi noted correctly that purely moral claims to compensation were not recognised by 
common law – which was historically content to leave the burden of accidents with victims, unless 
some proper defendant could be clearly identified. 
In Calabresi's defence, he might have said that anyone worried about personal injury could 
always hedge by purchasing insurance, at whatever level of compensation they preferred. Personal 
safety was best understood as a commodity, and thus could be removed altogether from the 
customary moral calculus. The community of potential accident victims should each consider 
purchasing individual, first-person insurance policies. In such a community, sovereign consumers 
will decide, in the aggregate, how much safety and how much future prevention they want. The only 
question worth asking was how the efficiency criterion could be made operational in a chaotic 
common law system. If there were any other ethical issues left over, Calabresi concluded, they 
should be exiled beyond the framework of rational policy debate.19 
C Funding ACC Programme Costs 
Woodhouse was aware of these academic developments and thought their irrelevance should be 
plain enough to advocates of community responsibility. As it turned out, he underestimated the 
attraction of these ideas, even as intellectual cover for more practical interests in lowering ACC 
programme costs.  But he had fully anticipated the local argument that there was not enough money 
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to fund a new comprehensive ACC. As Chair of the Royal Commission, he made sure that one of its 
members was an accountant; and the Report deals extensively with cost estimates.20 On a strategic 
level, his calculations were pragmatic: if he could fund the new scheme mostly with existing 
revenue streams (insurance premiums currently being paid for workers' compensation and motor 
vehicle insurance), then the community could begin to discharge its responsibilities with only few 
adjustments. After the abolition of tort, there would be no returning to common law; the logic of 
community responsibility would assert itself more boldly over the long run. 
D Policy Hesitations on Implementing Community Responsibility 
Thus Woodhouse himself proposed certain ways that community responsibility might be eased 
into immediate practice. Looking ahead to the future, community responsibility should rightly apply 
to all kinds of personal incapacity – whether by injury or disease (a distinction that disappears in the 
matrix of complex causality). But Woodhouse expected this grander logic to unfold only with the 
passage of time.21 There were good reasons to expect the momentum to build. In a deeply 
interdependent society, once the community has discovered its interdependence, and has coalesced 
around it, public policy can move gradually and inexorably toward the realisation of community 
responsibility. In retrospect this may seem like magical thinking. But it furnishes an important clue 
to the whole mystery of community responsibility: beyond the economic challenges, there were 
even greater political requirements for establishing a new ACC scheme. The facts of social 
interdependence, when brought to the surface, would need to generate a new spirit of solidarity, with 
a fresh assertion of political will. No such breakthrough occurred in New Zealand. 
Among the signs that community responsibility would not be self-implementing were the 
reports of two subsequent Royal Commissions: on Social Security (1972) and on Social Policy 
(1987–1988). The Social Security Royal Commission felt pressure coming from community 
responsibility, which contained a prima facie argument for upgrading some types of social 
entitlement. As Woodhouse noted, the matrix of interdependence behind personal injuries held 
implications for disease-based disability and sickness. But the Social Security Royal Commission 
drew a firm line between the domain of accidents (keeping it genealogically pinned to its common 
law antecedents) and other entitlements. It accepted none of the "responsibility" language embedded 
in community responsibility, including the notion that the sick or disease-disabled should be 
rehabilitated for the sake of the community as a whole.22 By the time the Social Policy Royal 
  
20  See Woodhouse's comments on Geoffrey Parsons in his 2007 informal remarks at an Auckland conference: 
Owen Woodhouse "ACC Anniversary – 13 December 2007" (paper presented at Accident Compensation 40 
Years On: a Symposium to Celebrate the Woodhouse Report, Auckland, December 2007).  
21  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, at [17]. 
22  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security Social Security in New Zealand: Report of 
the Royal Commission of Inquiry (1972). For an analysis of the Social Security implications of ACC, see 
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Commission made its report, the Law and Economics movement had popularised norms for limiting 
regulatory prevention – omitting to recognise ethical dimensions of unpaid social costs, where 
random elements of the community had already paid a heavy price that never showed up in market-
place balance sheets.23 The Chairs of these two Royal Commissions might have sympathised with 
ACC itself, but they saw no reason to extend community responsibility beyond the narrow scope of 
personal injury compensation. 
E Social Contract Theory 
There were additional signs that the inchoate community invoked by community responsibility 
was losing political traction, even in the arguments of ACC's most ardent defenders. By the 1990s, a 
new and simpler ACC moral foundation gained attention – the notion of a social contract. The 
ethical import of such a contract comes from the metaphor of individual will rather than social 
solidarity. This contract was held to be an agreement by beneficiaries to give up their right to sue for 
personal injury damages, in exchange for benefits that would approximate the damages offered in a 
well-run tort system. For both sides, the bargain was motivated by economics (sparing the 
macroeconomy the costs of administrative waste in tort), backed by the thin moral guarantee of a 
handshake between consenting parties. One can look in vain in the Woodhouse Report for any hint 
of this bargain. As moral backing for the ACC scheme, it fragments community responsibilityw's 
concept of community. It replaces the social model of interdependence and solidarity with the 
market metaphor of a bargain between interest groups. As such, it captures more candidly the 
flavour of ACC policy debates, especially as they echoed through the contentious 1980s and 1990s. 
By this point, ACC policy had turned into a familiar battle between beneficiary groups (the injured) 
and funding groups (employers, drivers, and, at the margins, taxpayers). The controversy was how 
generous benefits should be, and how strict to make the criteria of entitlement. The contract-
fulfilment argument had difficulty holding back the countervailing cost-saving arguments. It was, 
indeed, a last-ditch turn to ethics in a policy marketplace where the common currency was 
conserving cost. 
IV THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW COMMUNITY 
Despite the clarity Woodhouse achieved in formulating community responsibility, in retrospect 
the problems of political implementation seem entirely predictable. Although strikingly framed as a 
hybrid scheme borrowing from both law and social welfare, ACC implementation faced the same 
strong headwinds as other social welfare programmes in developed nations. As German sociologist 
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Claus Offe observed in the 1980s, the disillusionment with welfare principles in social-democratic 
societies could be traced to a decline in the shared sense of solidarity. To restore that sense, wrote 
Offe:24  
… the critical sociological variable is some notion of commonality of interest and fate, of 'sameness,' or 
a sufficiently binding conception of a durable collective identity, which is the ultimate resource that 
keeps cooperation intact beyond its initial phase.  
By providing exactly this kind of social conception, community responsibility might have pushed 
forcefully against the trend. But instead of injecting new moral purpose into policy debates, 
community responsibility went into eclipse. For still deeper insight into this mystery, we must go 
back even further in time to the American philosopher John Dewey, in a classic series of lectures, 
published in 1927 as The Public and Its Problems.25 
A Dewey and the Problem of Community Self-Governance 
Although writing nearly a century ago, Dewey was interested in the normative changes facing 
societies that had passed through sudden growth spurts. In the case of the United States, the late-
19th century surge in industrial development prompted a shift from largely rural forms of life to 
denser urban environments. Strong ties of families and local communities were losing their grip, 
giving way to the weaker ties of growing urbanisation, factory employment, mass consumption and 
the population "melting pot" that transformed American life by the 1930s. If solidarity was an 
habitual norm for small-scale American society, what would happen to feelings of solidarity in this 
new matrix of complex ties in the initial stages of industrialisation? In particular, Dewey asked how 
political institutions would fare in a period when interest-group politics was eroding the traditional 
notion of a unified public interest.  
Rather than looking backward with nostalgia, Dewey was searching for new concepts and 
political forms that would allow a richer, more complex "public interest" to emerge under changing 
social conditions. He found a working definition for this modern "public", combining structural and 
normative elements; but he cautioned (in 1927) that it was still inchoate, and would, in fact, face 
great difficulty breaking into the full light of day. Below the surface of modern life there was a new 
kind of "public" waiting to emerge, but it would likely remain "in eclipse" until new concepts gave 
voice to this modern form of solidarity. These concepts would need to generate more intense norms 
of reciprocity, leading to new political initiatives. The public's problems are "political" in the sense 
that self-government remains an unfulfilled dream until such time as the hidden public comes to 
recognise itself, and to embody its awareness in public policy. His book concluded, somewhat 
  
24  Claus Offe "Democracy Against the Welfare State?: Structural Foundations of Neoconservative Political 
Opportunities" (1987) 15 Political Theory 501 at 523.  
25  John Dewey The Public and Its Problems (Henry Holt, New York, 1927). 
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pessimistically, that this "search for the public" might continue indefinitely, in an age where social 
identity was busily fragmenting. 
Dewey's lectures offered a modernist notion of "the public", putting aside prior philosophies and 
standard definitions, while taking an empirical perspective on the social relations of his day. He 
defined his hidden "public" as an inchoate network of persons affected by the "indirect 
consequences" of private transactions.26 Such a network, composed of non-bargained relationships 
that go beyond market transactions, reminds us of Kapp's discovery of "unpaid social costs" in the 
1950s, at the beginning of the environmental movement. And of course it anticipates the principle of 
community responsibility elaborated by Woodhouse in the 1960s. Dewey's analysis directs attention 
to the key political demand in community responsibility: that mutual responsibility requires active 
self-government by the interdependent community. The challenge might first present itself as 
economic – but the core problem is political. 
All these concepts share a family resemblance, which in our own time includes, first and 
foremost, the politics of global climate change. The template for an interdependent public goes back 
to Dewey, who correctly noted the problems of reconciling modern forms of interdependence with 
the discrete individualism of market transactions, political interest groups and thin moral obligations 
derived from contract.27 The community of all those "indirectly affected" lies beneath the surface of 
common transactional forms – still waiting to emerge. Woodhouse's community responsibility 
principle expresses this distinctive ethics of reciprocity. In a modern society, solidarity is no longer 
based on kinship, archaic legal duties, contracts or market warranties; it comes from an interactive 
matrix like the one Woodhouse posits. One thing we all share in common is our exposure to the 
risks of modern living. There is a community, as Woodhouse describes it, of participants in a system 
that generates "statistically inevitable" risks, falling randomly on some members of that community. 
The fact that unpaid costs have already been incurred requires a full and urgent response from all 
who participate in this risk-bearing community. Implementing that response in effective policy is 
vital to the political ideal of self-governance. 
B Defining the Risk Community and Its Responsibilities 
There were other notable attempts to address the policy implications of Dewey's "public and its 
problems". Coming from the same social-democratic context as Woodhouse, the British welfare 
theorist Richard Titmuss was another eloquent voice ready to speak on behalf of Dewey's emergent 
public. Writing in the 1980s, Titmuss described a three-step progression of social programmes in the 
post-World War Two industrial era. He called the first two steps the "residual welfare" model and 
the "industrial, achievement-performance" model. The former includes the Thatcher and Reagan 
  
26  At 15–16.  
27  At 141. (These issues were raised not only in the United States, but were also explored in classic studies by 
Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Tönnies.) 
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safety-net approach to welfare, under which the only public role is to address temporary failures in 
the dominant social institutions of families and markets. The second model accepts need-based 
welfare programmes as permanent adjuncts to industrialised economies, and thus as components of 
politically managed capitalism. Under both approaches, state-administered benefits are limited to 
selective groups near the bottom of the economic scale. Their purpose is to sustain the lower strata, 
to keep them functioning in a social system defined primarily by market processes. 
By contrast, Titmuss' third "institutional-redistributive" model holds reciprocal values similar to 
the community responsibility principle. This model rests on:28  
… theories about the multiplier diswelfare and disrupting effects of change, industrial, technological, 
social, and economic; and in part on a conception of social justice which sees man not only as an 
individual but as a member of groups and associations.  
The goals for public policy, under this model, are:29 
… to promote integrative values, to prevent future diswelfares, to penetrate economic policies with 
social welfare objectives, and in all these ways to bring about a redistribution in command over 
resources over time.  
(He might well have added Dewey's self-government goal.) This model "challenges different 
societies at different stages of development … to determine a particular infrastructure of universalist 
services".30 
The potential community in community responsibility would need to build political solidarity on 
the common experience of generating risks, of bearing and sustaining risks, and of remediating 
future risks. This Woodhousian definition is a modernist concept, which must somehow emerge and 
declare itself, but without exploiting traditional sentiments and symbols that united earlier 
communities around the veneration of gods, kings or kin. The simple idea that "we are all in this 
together" struggles to reach beyond a small subset of the electorate – today more likely to be found 
in the environmental lobby than the ACC lobby. In global terms, the most important test shaping up 
for this hidden community will be enacting policies for combatting global warming. One cannot yet 
see how a global risk community will discover itself, let alone govern itself, with sufficient time to 
make a difference. Lessons from the New Zealand risk community, even with the rhetorical boost 
from community responsibility, suggest we must follow Dewey's caution. 
  
28  Richard M Titmuss "Developing Social Policy in Conditions of Rapid Change" in Brian Abel-Smith and 
Kay Titmuss (eds) The Philosophy of Welfare: Selected Writings of Richard M Titmuss (Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1987) 254 at 263–264.  
29  At 263–264. 
30  At 263–264.  
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V THE ECLIPSE OF SOCIAL COST THEORY 
A mystery parallel to the eclipse of community responsibility is the fact that Kapp's post-war 
theory of "unpaid social costs" was thoroughly buried by the 1970s. His theory was not so much 
analysed and rejected as simply bypassed by the new idioms of welfare economics. Along with 
Calabresi, a seminal essay by Ronald Coase on "The Problem of Social Cost" (which never 
mentions Kapp or anyone in that social-cost tradition) offered an alternative discourse, leaving Kapp 
in the shadows.31 
The rise of welfare-economic models in the late 1960s pre-empted new policy responses to the 
problems of risk communities. This shift was not some evil conspiracy, but reflects an historic 
retreat by the state from its stewardship of social relations and social justice. In the field of accidents 
– not just in New Zealand, but globally – political institutions found themselves unable to manage 
complex risk factors that were already evident by the 1950s.32 As the environmental movement 
surmised in the 1960s, continual advances in scientific knowledge were expanding the frontiers of 
uncertainty, uncovering a host of ill-defined risk factors at the margins of economic progress. At the 
time, it was reasonable to think that modern inequality resulted as much from the random 
distribution of risk as from the distribution of wealth or income. This retreat into welfare economics 
can be seen as a rearguard effort, suspending the renegotiation of new social responsibilities. 
The fate of Kapp's theory shares important features with the policy debates surrounding ACC. 
The erosion of community responsibility stems ultimately from the political struggle of the 
Woodhousian risk community finding its policy footing. It is a struggle for self-recognition and self-
governance. The roots of failure were hard to discern, as New Zealand policy debates gradually 
abandoned the ethical dimensions of community responsibility, instead importing market metaphors 
from the Law and Economics movement. These concepts entered the mainstream rapidly after a test 
run in the important 1969 White Paper on ACC. And, indeed, they had already been used by 
Terence Ison in his much admired 1967 book The Forensic Lottery – which the Woodhouse 
Commission had consulted in manuscript, before creating a different language in community 
responsibility.33 
  
31  RH Coase "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.  
32  For a classic statement of this position, see Ulrich Beck Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage 
Publications, London, 1992) (a translation of Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne 
(1986)). 
33  Ison, above n 4, at 58. 
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A Institutionalist Theory of Social Costs 
K William Kapp's theory of social costs falls within the American Institutionalist school of 
economics, which Kapp encountered as a refugee from Germany after World War Two.34 His 
research covered both developed and developing societies, based on his own extensive fieldwork. In 
his 1950s writings on social costs, Kapp identifies a specific kind of social harm marked by five 
conditions: (1) these harms are "normal and typical" phenomena in industrial societies, documented 
retrospectively through empirical study, at least at the statistical level (for example, epidemiology); 
(2) they are causally complex (for example, gradual process injuries or multi-factor environmental 
disease); (3) they are embedded in relational networks of concrete persons and things, and are not 
mere functions of subjective attitudes; (4) their complexity and relational structure place them 
beyond the scope of micro-economic calculation (outside the bounds of neo-classical rationality); 
and (5) they are imposed without contractual specification on parties to an exchange (for example, 
newly identified occupational diseases), or are shifted to people and environments lying outside the 
exchange transaction (for example, victims of second-hand smoke). 
B The Neo-Institutionalist Alternative 
Kapp's theory of social costs was ultimately eclipsed by "neo-institutionalist" alternatives, of 
which the best known is the famous Coase essay.35 Coase and his neo-institutionalist colleagues 
never directly challenged Kapp's model, but simply reframed the discussion of social costs within a 
different conceptual idiom. Kapp identified social costs with concrete harms befalling real people. 
The neo-institutionalists treated them as accounting data in real or hypothetical exchanges – harms 
seen as depersonalised, calculable sums, the residue of failed bargains between potential exchange 
partners. (Adam Smith would have called this a shift from use values to exchange values.)36 In a 
Coasean world it is impossible to say – putting aside the prevailing property regime – whether the 
polluter is harming the pollutee, or the other way around. The exchange relationship (real or 
hypothetical) always presumes this analytical symmetry, and neo-institutionalist policy concentrates 
on restoring that neutral balance in the face of market imperfections. 
These different conceptions of harm are decisive for designing a public policy scheme for 
personal injuries and preventable illness. In Kapp's world, where personal injury is part of the 
unpaid social costs of modern industrial society, the appropriate response is a comprehensive public 
  
34  There has been a recent revival of scholarship on Kapp and his intellectual context. See Sebastian Berger 
"The Making of the Institutional Theory of Social Costs: Discovering the K. W. Kapp and J. M. Clark 
Correspondence" (2013) 72 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 1106. Kapp's works are in the 
process of being edited and reissued. More established figures in American Institutionalist Economics 
include John Maurice Clark and John R Commons.   
35  Coase, above n 31. 
36  Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) book I at ch 4. 
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scheme devoted to prevention, rehabilitation and compensation – anticipating the logic of 
community responsibility. In contrast, neo-institutionalist policy creates shadow-markets to reduce 
costs of potential bargaining, thereby allowing market forces to find the right level of compensation 
and prevention. In this bargain-centred response, what we might call the "market public" remains 
indifferent between the plight of the industrial disease victim and the plight of the factory that must 
mitigate exposures to carcinogens, assuming impediments to potential bargaining have been 
removed. Bargainers themselves can address any subjective uncertainties by purchasing private 
insurance. 
For Kapp, social costs are "normal and typical" consequences of transactions common to 
industrial economies. These costs cannot be forced back into the bottle of discrete exchange or 
bargaining relationships.  Social costs can afflict exchange partners but also, more importantly, 
those outside the scope of exchange. In Kapp's words:37 
[A] substantial proportion of the actual costs of production remain unaccounted for in entrepreneurial 
outlays; instead they are shifted to, and ultimately borne by, third persons or by the community as a 
whole.  
These unpaid social costs have financial, environmental, medical, psychological and cultural 
dimensions – and they are also notorious for reaching into future generations of victims.  
The Coase article can be seen, in retrospect, as a pioneering essay operating under a new 
economic idiom, presupposing a new kind of community. Borrowing from the fashionable academic 
embrace of general equilibrium economics (though without displaying any of its mathematical 
tools), Coase reflected a growing skepticism about public insurance and democratic authority. In the 
language of welfare economics, value and legitimacy come from the sovereign preferences of 
individual consumers. At the level of ethics, there was simply no way to calculate the kinds of 
harms posited by Kapp (and later by Woodhouse).38 
C Employer Levies under ACC 
The neo-institutionalist preference for market remedies caught hold in New Zealand during the 
1980s. This shift can be seen most clearly in the turn away from expanding the grounds for 
entitlements, and toward a stricter allocation of programme costs among private funders of the 
  
37  Kapp, above n 10, at 231. 
38  Calabresi was likely the only neo-institutionalist to mention Kapp by name. He conceded the drift of Kapp's 
work but complained that it would be too "costly" to bring it into a bargaining framework (meaning high 
"transaction costs" in Coase's Delphic phrase). But the gap is one of quality rather than quantity, where we 
are dealing with two incommensurable modes of calculation. For Calabresi on Kapp, see Guido Calabresi 
"Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Tort" (1961) 70 Yale LJ 499 at 532–533.  
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scheme.39 Much discussion was devoted to setting differential levies for separate industries – and 
individual companies – based on the personal injuries they "caused" (a concept alien to 
Woodhouse). But the ultimate goal of neo-institutionalist policy was best articulated by the New 
Zealand Business Roundtable.40 They argued that injury burdens should be managed on the funding 
side, always and exclusively, through institutions of market exchange. Uncompensated harms of 
personal injury should be addressed by creating private markets for insurance and risk management. 
Government mandates that do not pass the test of emulating market systems should be treated with 
the greatest scepticism. From this perspective, it is less important to compensate past injuries than to 
treat yesterday's events as financial signals to today's risk managers, who can then decide how much 
money to invest in tomorrow's prevention. Taken to the extreme, this point of view considers the 
whole public compensation scheme as an anomaly, since injured people should already have 
purchased first-party insurance. Going forward, society should strive to achieve only the level of 
prevention it is willing to pay for, as determined by market mechanisms. Risk reduction is an 
investment decision best delegated to individual companies and persons. 
The contrast is plain between this value philosophy, stated in its purest form, and the 
Woodhouse community responsibility principle. Woodhouse did not assign injuries, via causation, 
to specific risk-creating activities by particular market actors. He maintained that all risk-bearing 
activities were interdependent, and that ACC programme costs for compensation and prevention 
should be funded primarily from general taxation.41 As a practical matter, he relented by accepting 
existing funding streams from workers' compensation premiums and motor vehicle insurance. The 
eclipse of community responsibility can be seen most clearly in the long and bitter history of ACC 
funding disputes. The ethical dimensions of community responsibility were lost in acrid debates 
about who should pay the price, when someone else might have caused the harm. The script for 
these discussions was inspired by Calabresi and Coase, coming with the eclipse of Kapp. 
VI THE FINANCIALISATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
In practical discussions of ACC policy, the market allocation model has pushed aside the 
community responsibility principle. Some of this is just old-fashioned self-interest, in the scrum 
where ACC payers seek to lower their levies, on the grounds they should not cross-subsidise others 
who truly cause accidents. Levy payers confront each other, and they confront those entitled to ACC 
  
39  These changes can be traced in the Accident Compensation Act 1982, and the intriguingly named Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. (Both were repealed and replaced by the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001 and subsequent amendments.) The 1992 legislation was clearly a bridge to the 
kinds of proposals best articulated by the New Zealand Business Roundtable. 
40  See New Zealand Business Roundtable "Submission to the Law Commission on the Review of Accident 
Compensation" (December 1987). 
41  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, at [314] and [467]. At [490], Woodhouse noted that "there will be no place 
for special arrangements or for 'contracting out'". 
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benefits, armed with their own individual safety records and profitability charts. This is obviously a 
different community from the interdependent risk-bearers defined by community responsibility. The 
ACC levy system imagines a world in which the risks of modern living have been fully reduced to 
financial terms, ready to be negotiated in market transactions. Although increasingly complex, ACC 
funding formulas cannot keep up with all the claims about cross-subsidisation and distorted 
economic incentives. 
We are closer to solving the enigma of the disappearing community responsibility principle. Of 
course, it has not disappeared from the printed page, nor from the heartfelt advocacy of ACC 
proponents. It still finds support in its family resemblance to other concepts, notably environmental 
protection. Nonetheless, its effective disappearance signals the rise of different concepts of 
community, primarily market communities that are united – not politically – but in exchange. The 
fate of community responsibility can be understood in a broad political context, global in scope, 
where political deliberation has yielded to economic calculation – on its way into the portfolios of 
financial experts.  
A recent monograph has examined this shift over the past four decades. In her empirical study of 
American public policy, including the rise of financial institutions for economic governance, 
political scientist Greta Kippner has updated the classic predictions of sociologist Daniel Bell, who 
diagnosed the turn to finance in developed countries as the result of a political legitimation crisis. 
Outsourcing political choices to market czars gained momentum in the 1970s, in the face of 
tumultuous global economic cycles, when politicians lost confidence in their ability to steer the 
macroeconomy using classic Keynesian tools – and the public lost confidence in their political 
leaders to manage crises on behalf of the community as a whole. As Bell remarked, democratic 
governance needs a public philosophy to validate collective decisions about the distribution of 
wealth. Bell's point would apply equally to decisions about the distribution of risk, the primary 
mission of ACC. 
As Kippner notes:42 
… markets do not supply their own normative foundations – as Bell wrote, "The market is a mechanism, 
not a principle of justice" … In the financialization of the economy, policymakers would find an 
exceptional resolution to the various policy dilemmas they confronted in the guise of social crisis, fiscal 
crisis, and legitimation crisis of the state … Traveling a further distance from the political, problem 
areas may migrate from governmental or non-governmental publics to the private realm of domestic 
deliberation and consumer choice. Relegated to this realm, problems are still subject to human decision 
… but no longer subject to public scrutiny and deliberation. 
  
42  Greta R Kippner Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2014) at 141, 144 and 146. Her interlocutor Daniel Bell's key work, for these 
purposes, is Daniel Bell The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (Basic Books, New York, 1976), 
republished in a 20th anniversary edition (20th anniversary ed, Basic Books, New York, 1996). 
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Along with Daniel Bell in the 1970s, Kippner's study echoes Dewey's haunting analysis of the 
public in eclipse. Politics as usual cannot serve the interdependent community of community 
responsibility, nor solve the problem of unpaid social costs, without "a public philosophy to guide 
decisions about distribution." The turn to markets, and especially to financial markets, says Kippner, 
has "allowed policymakers to shield themselves from responsibility for unfavourable events",43 
although their luck (and ours) may be running out.  The unintended results of conducting economic, 
fiscal and social policy through financial institutions includes the prospect of credit crises, asset 
bubbles and their inevitable strain on communities – measured as conflict rather than people pulling 
together. 
Not everyone sees this trend in a negative light. The irrepressible Robert J Shiller continues to 
advocate for the creation of new global financial instruments as a way to unleash the market for 
managing the most significant risks of our time: serious earthquakes, global warming and pandemic 
diseases.44 The wisdom of the market will decide when and how to invest in combatting, preventing 
or mitigating these events. Shiller is less clear on the backup regulatory regime such new 
instruments would require, or what guarantees would come from outside the financial system in the 
event of market meltdown. He does not deal with the extremes, but sees finance as the best (because 
it is the only) available institution for addressing modern problems of risk. It may be a hollow claim. 
And in any case, it is unlikely to be implemented anytime soon. 
If there remains some enigmatic aspect of community responsibility untouched in these 
reflections, it may be the surprising fact that community responsibility is still with us, a half-century 
after it was created. And while its persistence may have become a ritual, there is something about 
these two strong words that we cannot finally do without. It still seems true that "community" goes 
deeper than joining a group of consumers. And there must be something more to "responsibility" 
than simply and always honouring one's bargains. Woodhouse may have been onto something when 
he opened his Report with the grim reminder about the bedrock toll of personal injury.45 He tried to 
connect these hard facts to a new policy regime, even if we have since lost the thread. But 
community responsibility retains a bewitching quality, beckoning a future community to find its 
own voice. The ongoing social problem of personal injury has clearly not been solved. What 
Woodhouse said in 1967 remains true today: "Such a fragmented and capricious response to a social 
problem which cries out for co-ordinated and comprehensive treatment cannot be good enough."46 
  
43  Kippner, above n 42, at 147. 
44  Robert J Shiller The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2003). A more accessible version of his theory is Robert J Shiller Finance and the Good Society (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2012). In 2013, Shiller was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. 
45  Woodhouse Report, above n 1, at [1].  
46  At [1].  
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For new generations contemplating ACC and the host of puzzles surrounding it, Woodhouse keeps 
the challenge open:47 
The rate at which social institutions and ideas are being turned upside down is not merely dramatic – it 
is accelerating every year in a fashion which demands a great deal of mental energy to keep pace. It 
cannot be good enough, therefore, to adjust merely to the contemporary needs. Some deliberate attention 
should be given to the foreseeable demands of the years immediately ahead. And if there seem to be a 
weight of tradition against change, at least it is worth remembering that the apparent heresies of one 
generation become the orthodoxies of the next. The ultimate validity of any social measure will depend 
not upon its antecedents but upon its current and future utility. 
 
  
47  At [33].  
